Logics for first-order team properties by Kontinen, Juha & Yang, Fan
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
08
69
5v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
8 A
pr
 20
19
Logics for first-order team properties
Juha Kontinen and Fan Yang
University of Helsinki, Finland
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a logic based on team semantics, called
FOT, whose expressive power coincides with first-order logic both on the level of
sentences and (open) formulas, and we also show that a sublogic of FOT, called
FOT↓, captures exactly downward closed first-order team properties. We axiom-
atize completely the logic FOT, and also extend the known partial axiomatization
of dependence logic to dependence logic enriched with the logical constants in
FOT↓.
Keywords: Dependence logic · Team semantics · First-order logic.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we define logics based on team semantics for characterizing first-order
team properties, and we also study the axiomatization problem of these logics.
Team semantics is a semantical framework originally introduced by Hodges [21],
and later systematically developed by Va¨a¨na¨nen with the introduction of dependence
logic [31], which extends first-order logic with dependence atoms. Other notable log-
ics based on team semantics include independence logic introduced by Gra¨del and
Va¨a¨na¨nen [16] (which is first-order logic extended with independence atoms), and in-
clusion logic introduced by Galliani [11] (which is first-order logic extended with inclu-
sion atoms). In team semantics formulas are evaluated in a model over sets of assign-
ments for the free variables (called teams) rather than single assignments as in the usual
first-order logic. Teams X with the domain {v1, . . . ,vk} are essentially k-ary relations
rel(X) = {(s(v1), . . . ,s(vk)) | s ∈X}, and thus open formulas define team properties.
In general, knowing the expressive power of a logic for sentences (with no free vari-
ables) does not automatically give a characterization for the expressive power of open
formulas of the same logic. Such a peculiar phenomenon has sparked several studies
on the expressive power of logics based on team semantics. In particular, while it fol-
lows straightforwardly from the earlier known results of Henkin, Enderton,Walkoe, and
Hodges [20,8,32,22] that dependence logic (D) and independence logic (Ind) are both
equivalent to existential second-order logic (ESO) on the level of sentences, it turns out
that open formulas of D have different expressive power from open formulas of Ind:
The latter characterize all ESO team properties [11], whereas the former characterize
only downward closed ESO team properties [26]. Along the same line, a later break-
through showed that inclusion logic corresponds, over sentences, to positive greatest
fixed-point logic [15], which is strictly more expressive than first-order logic as well.
In this paper we define a team-based logic, called FOT, whose expressive power coin-
cides with first-order logic (FO) both on the level of sentences and open formulas, in
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the sense that FOT-formulas characterize (modulo the empty team) exactly team prop-
erties definable by first-order sentences with an extra relation symbol R. To the best of
the authors’ knowledge, no such logic has been defined previously.
In related previous work, it was shown in [10,13,28] that first-order logic extended
with constancy atoms=(x) and FO extended with classical negation∼ are both equiv-
alent to FO over sentences, whereas on the level of formulas they are both strictly less
expressive than FO, and thus fail to capture all first-order team properties. It was also
illustrated in [24] that a certain simple disjunction of dependence atoms already defines
an NP-complete team property. Therefore, any logic based on team semantics having
the disjunction ∨ inherited from first-order logic and in which dependence atoms are
expressible will be able to express NP-complete team properties indicating that ∨ is too
expressive connective to be added to FOT. The logic FOT we define in this paper has
weaker version of disjunction \\/ and classical negation ∼˙ as well as weaker quantifiers
∀1,∃1. We prove, in Section 3, that our logic FOT captures first-order team properties
(modulo the empty team) and we also show, as an application of Lyndon’s Interpolation
Theorem of first-order logic, that a sublogic of FOT, denoted as FOT↓, captures exactly
downward closed first-order team properties (modulo the empty team).
In the second part of this paper study the axiomatization problem of our logics FOT
and FOT↓. In Section 4 we introduce a sound and complete system of natural deduction
for FOT that on one hand behaves like the system of FO to a certain extend (in the
sense of Lemma 12), while on the other hand incorporates natural and interesting rules
for inclusion atoms and their interaction with the weak logical constants.
In Section 5, we apply our results to the problem of finding axiomatizations for
larger and larger fragments of dependence logic and its variants by extending the known
partial axiomatization of dependence logic to D enriched with the logical constants in
FOT↓ (denoted as D⊕FOT↓), which, by our result in the first part of this paper, is ex-
pressively equivalent to D. While D is not effectively axiomatizable (for it is equivalent
to ESO), a complete axiomatization for first-order consequences of D-sentences has
been given in [27]. More precisely, a system of natural deduction for dependence logic
was introduced in [27] for which the completeness theorem
Γ ⊢ θ ⇐⇒ Γ |= θ (1)
holds whenever Γ is a set of D-sentences and θ is an FO-sentence. This result has
been, subsequently, generalized to e.g., allows also open formulas [25], and treats also
independence logic [17] or dependence logic with generalized quantifiers [9]. A recent
new generalization given in [33] extends the known systems for D and Ind to cover the
case when θ in (1) is not necessarily an FO-formula but merely a formula defining a
first-order team property. However, since the problem of whether a D- or Ind-formula
defines a first-order team property is undecidable, the extension of [33] is not effectively
represented. Motivated by the results of [33], we give an effective extension of (1), in
which θ is a sentence of our compositionally defined logic FOT↓ and Γ is a set of
D⊕FOT↓-sentences. Finding an effective axiomatization in the more general case of
Ind enriched with the logical constants in FOT is left as future work.
Apart from theoretical significance, our results also provide new logical tools for
the applications of team-based logics in other related areas; such applications have
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been studied in recent years, e.g., in database theory [19], formal semantics of natu-
ral language [4,5], Bayesian statistics [18,7], social choice theory [30], and quantum
information theory [23]. In particular, inquisitive logic [6] adopts, independently, also
the team semantics to provide formal semantics of questions in natural language, and
the first-order version of inquisitive logic can be viewed as a team-based logic (in a
slightly different setting) with the weak disjunction \\/ and the weak quantifiers ∀1,∃1.
The study we provide in this paper for the expressive power and axiomatization problem
of these weaker logical constants will potentially help clarifying properties of first-order
inquisitive logic. In the recent formalization of Arrow’s Theorem [2] in social choice in
independence logic [30], the weak disjunction \\/ plays a natural role, and the complete-
ness theorem of the type (1) was crucial for deriving Arrow’s Theorem formally. The
axiomatization results we obtained in this paper are then expected to contribute to the
formal analysis of Arrow’s Theorem and other impossibility theorems in social choice.
2 Preliminaries
We consider first-order vocabularies L with an equality symbol =. An L-term t is de-
fined inductively as usual, and formulas of First-order Logic (FO) are defined as:
α ::= t1 = t2 | Rt1 . . . tk | ¬α | α∧α | α∨α | ∃xα | ∀xα.
Throughout the paper, we reserve the first Greek letters α,β,γ,δ for first-order formu-
las. As usual, define α→ β := ¬α∨β. We use the letters v,x,y,z, . . . in sans-serif face
to stand for sequences of variables, and sequences of terms are denoted as t, t′, . . . We
write Fv(α) for the set of free variables of α, and write α(x) to indicate that the free
variables of α are among x= 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉. A formula with no free variables is called a
sentence.
For any L-model M , we use the same notation M also to denote its domain. We
write L(R) for the vocabulary expanded from L by adding a fresh relation symbol R,
and write (M,RM ) for the L(R)-expansion ofM in which the k-ary relation symbolR
is interpreted asRM ⊆Mk. We sometimes write α(R) to emphasize that the first-order
formula α is in the vocabulary L(R) for some L.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the usual Tarskian semantics of first-order
logic. In this paper, we consider logics with team semantics. A teamX ofM over a set
V of variables is a set of assignments s : V →M , where V is called the domain of X ,
denoted dom(X). Given a first-order formula α, given any L-modelM and any team
X over V ⊇ Fv(α), we define the satisfaction relationM |=X α inductively as follows:
– M |=X λ for λ a first-order atom iff for all s ∈X ,M |=s λ in the usual sense.
– M |=X ¬α iff for all s ∈X ,M 6|={s} α.
– M |=X α∧β iff M |=X α andM |=X β.
– M |=X α∨β iff there are Y,Z ⊆X such thatX = Y ∪Z ,M |=Y α andM |=Z β.
– M |=X ∃xα iff M |=X(F/x) α for some F :X→ ℘(M)\{ /0}, whereX(F/x) =
{s(a/x) | s ∈X, a ∈ F (s)}.
– M |=X ∀xα iff M |=X(M/x) α, whereX(M/x) = {s(a/x) | s ∈X, a ∈M}.
It is easy to verify that first-order formulas have the following properties:
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Empty team property: M |= /0 φ
Downward closure: [M |=X φ and Y ⊆X ] =⇒M |=Y φ.
Union closure: [M |=X φ andM |=Y φ ] =⇒M |=X∪Y φ.
Downward closure property together with union closure property are equivalent to
Flatness property: M |=X φ ⇐⇒ M |={s} φ for all s ∈X .
Logics based on team semantics do not in general have the flatness property. For in-
stance, dependence logic [31], which is first-order logic extended with dependence
atoms =(t1, . . . , tn, t), is downward closed but not flat; and inclusion logic [11], which
is first-order logic extended with inclusion atoms t1, . . . , tn ⊆ t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n, is union closed
but not flat. Especially, dependence atoms and inclusion atoms are not flat. We recall
their semantics below:
– M |=X =(t, t
′) iff for all s,s′ ∈X , s(t) = s′(t) implies s(t′) = s′(t′).
– M |=X t⊆ t
′ iff for all s ∈X , there is s′ ∈X such that s(t) = s′(t′)
In this paper, we study two (non-flat) logics based on team semantics, called FOT
and FOT↓, whose formulas are built from a different (yet similar) set of connectives
and quantifiers than those in first-order logic as follows:
φ ::= λ | x⊆ y | ∼˙φ | φ∧φ | φ \\/φ | ∃1xφ | ∀1xφ(FOT)
φ ::= λ | ¬δ | φ∧φ | φ \\/φ | ∃1xφ | ∀1xφ(FOT↓)
where λ is an arbitrary first-order atomic formula, x and y are two sequences of variables
of the same length, and δ is a quantifier-free and disjunction-free formula (i.e., δ ::=
λ | ¬δ | δ ∧ δ). We call the logical constants ∼˙, \\/ ,∃1,∀1, which were introduced in
[33,1,26], weak classical negation, weak disjunction, weak existential quantifier and
weak universal quantifier, respectively. Their team semantics are defined as:
– M |=X ∼˙φ iff X = /0 orM 6|=X φ.
– M |=X φ \\/ψ iff M |=X φ orM |=X ψ.
– M |=X ∃
1xφ iff M |=X(a/x) φ for some a∈M , whereX(a/x)={s(a/x) | s∈X}.
– M |=X ∀
1xφ iffM |=X(a/x) φ for all a ∈M .
It is easy to verify that formulas of FOT and FOT↓ have the empty team property, and
FOT↓ formulas have the downward closure property.
In FOTwe adopt the usual convention for classical implication, and write φ_ψ for
∼˙φ \\/ψ and φ] ψ for (φ_ ψ)∧ (ψ _ φ). With the help of the classical implication
_, one can easily express ¬δ for δ being quantifier-free and disjunction free (or flat) as
¬δ(x) ≡ ∀1y(y ⊆ x _ ∼˙δ(y/x)).
Also, dependence atoms =(x,y) with variables as arguments are definable in FOT:
=(x,y) ≡ ∀1u0v0u1v1((u0v0 ⊆ xy∧u1v1 ⊆ xy∧u0 = u1) _ v0 = v1).
Recall that the constancy atom=(x) abbreviates the dependence atom=(〈〉,x) with the
first argument being the empty sequence 〈〉, and its semantics reduces to
– M |=X =(x) iff for all s,s
′ ∈X , s(x) = s′(x).
Constancy atoms can be defined alternatively as =(x)≡ ∃1y(y = x).
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3 Characterizing first-order team properties
In this section, we prove that FOT-formulas characterize first-order team properties
(modulo the empty team), and FOT↓-formulas characterize downward closed first-order
team properties (modulo the empty team).
Let us first define formally the relevant notions. Observe that a team X of an L-
modelM over a domain {v1, . . . ,vk} can also be viewed as a k-ary relation rel(X)⊆
Mk defined as rel(X) = {(s(v1), . . . ,s(vk)) | s ∈ X}. We call a collection PM ⊆
℘(Mk) of k-ary relations (or teams) of an L-model M a local team property; and a
(global) team property is a class P of local team properties PM for all L-models M .
A formula φ(v) of a logic based on team semantics clearly defines a team property
Pφ such that for all M , PφM = {rel(X) |M |=X φ(v)}. Clearly, the team properties
Pφ defined by FOT↓-formulas φ are downward closed, that is, A ⊆ B ∈ PφM implies
A ∈PφM for anyM . Note also that while the empty relation /0 may not be contained in a
team property PM , since all team-based logics considered in this paper have the empty
team property (i.e., /0 is in PφM for all φ), we will confine ourselves only to those team
properties P with the empty relation /0 contained in each local property PM .
We call a team property P first-order if there is a first-order L(R)-sentence α(R)
such that (M,A) |= α(R) iff A ∈ PM for all M and all nonempty relations A. It is
worth noting that we are using the terminology “definability” in two different semantic
settings: Even though every first-order team property P is (trivially) defined by some
first-order L(R)-sentence α(R) with an extra relation symbol R (in the sense of the
usual semantics of first-order logic), it does not follow that each such first-order team
propertyP is definable by some first-order L-formula β(v) in the team semantics sense
(i.e., P = PβM ). As a simple illustration, in view of the flatness property of first-order
formulas, the following very simple team property (of the empty vocabulary L0)
P≤1 = {(M,rel(X)) |M an L0-model and |X | ≤ 1}
cannot be defined by any first-order formula β(v) of the empty vocabulary L0.
We now show that the team properties defined by formulas of FOT and FOT↓ are
first-order.
Theorem 1. For any L-formula φ(v1, . . . ,vk) of FOT or FOT
↓, there exists a first-
order L(R)-sentence γφ(R) with a fresh k-ary relation symbol R such that for any
L-modelM and any teamX over {v1, . . . ,vk},
M |=X φ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= γφ(R). (2)
Proof. We prove the theorem by proving a slightly more general claim: For any subfor-
mula θ(v,x) of φ(v), there exists a first-order L(R)-formula γθ(R,x) such that for all
L-modelsM , teamsX and sequences a of elements inM ,
M |=X(a/x) θ(v,x) ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= γθ(R,x)(a/x).
It is easy to verify that the formula γθ defined inductively as follows (and found essen-
tially in, e.g., [11,33]) will work:
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– If θ(v,x) = δ(v,x) for some quantifier-free and disjunction-free first-order formula
δ, let γθ(R,x) = ∀u(Ru→ δ(u/v,x)).
– If θ(v,x) = ρ(vx) ⊆ σ(vx), where ρ(vx) and σ(vx) are two sequences of variables
from vx, let γθ(R,x) = ∀u∃w
(
Ru→ (Rw∧ρ(ux) = σ(wx))
)
.
– If θ(v,x) = θ0(v,x)∧ θ1(v,x) and does not belong to the case of the first item, let
γθ(R,x) = γθ0(R,x)∧γθ1(R,x).
– If θ(v,x) = θ0(v,x) \\/θ1(v,x), let γθ(R,x) = γθ0(R,x)∨γθ1(R,x).
– If θ(v,x) = ∼˙θ0(v,x), let γθ(R,x) = ¬γθ0(R,x)∨∀u¬Ru.
– If θ(v,x) = ∃1yθ0(v,yx), let γθ(R,x) = ∃yγθ0(R,yx).
– If θ(v,x) = ∀1yθ0(v,yx), let γθ(R,x) = ∀yγθ0(R,yx). ⊓⊔
Next we prove the reverse direction of Theorem 1, from which we can conclude
that FOT-formulas characterize exactly first-order team properties (modulo the empty
team).
Theorem 2. For any first-order L(R)-sentence γ(R) with a k-ary relation symbol R,
there exists an L-formula φγ(v1, . . . ,vk) of FOT such that for any L-modelM and any
nonempty teamX over {v1, . . . ,vk},
M |=X φγ(v) ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= γ(R).
Moreover, if R occurs in γ(R) only negatively (i.e., every occurrence of R is in the
scope of an odd number of nested negation symbols), φγ can be also chosen to be an
FOT↓-formula.
Proof. We may assume w.l.o.g. that the first-order sentence γ(R) is in prenex normal
formQ1x1 . . .Qnxnθ(x), whereQi ∈ {∀,∃}, θ is quantifier-free and in negation normal
form (i.e., negations occur only in front of atomic formulas), and every occurrence ofR
is of the form Rxi for some sequence xi of bound variables (for Rt≡ ∃y(y = t∧Ry)).
Define the translation φγ(v) := Q
1
1x1 . . .Q
1
nxnφθ(x,v) in FOT, where Q
1
i = ∀
1 if
Qi = ∀, Q
1
i = ∃
1 if Qi = ∃, and φθ(x,v) is defined inductively as follows:
– if θ = λ(x) is an atomic formula in which R does not occur, then φλ(x,v) = λ(x);
– if θ =Rxi, then φθ(x,v) = xi ⊆ v;
– if θ = ¬λ for some (atomic) formula λ, then φθ = ∼˙φλ;
– if θ = θ0∧ θ1, then φθ = φθ0 ∧φθ1 ;
– if θ = θ0∨ θ1, then φθ = φθ0 \\/φθ1 .
Next, we show by induction that for each quantifier-free formula θ(x), for any nonempty
teamX over {v1, . . . ,vk} and a1, . . . ,an ∈M ,
M |=X(a/x) φθ(x,v) ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= θ(a/x). (3)
If θ = λ(x) is an atomic formula in which R does not occur, then φλ = λ(x) and
M |=X(a/x) λ(x) ⇐⇒ M |=X λ(x)(a/x)
⇐⇒ M |=s λ(x)(a/x) for all s ∈X
⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= λ(a/x). (since R does not occur in λ)
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If θ =Rxi, then φθ = xi ⊆ v and
M |=X(a/x) xi ⊆ v ⇐⇒ For all s ∈X(a/x), there exists s
′ ∈X(a/x) s.t. s(xi) = s
′(v)
⇐⇒ ai ∈ rel(X) = {s
′(v) | s′ ∈X}
⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= Rxi(a/x).
If θ = ¬λ(x), then
M |=X(a/x) ∼˙φλ(x,v) ⇐⇒ M 6|=X(a/x) φλ(x,v) (sinceX(a/x) 6= /0)
⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) 6|= λ(a/x) (by induction hypothesis)
⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= ¬λ(a/x).
The cases when θ = θ0(x) ∨ θ1(x) and θ = θ0(x) ∧ θ1(x) follow easily from the
induction hypothesis.
Finally, we have
M |=X Q
1
1x1 . . .Q
1
nxnφθ(x,v) ⇐⇒Q1a1 ∈M ...Qnan ∈M : M |=X(a/x) φθ(x,v)
⇐⇒Q1a1 ∈M ...Qnan ∈M : (M,rel(X)) |= θ(a/x)
⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |=Q1x1 . . .Qnxnθ(x).
This completes the proof for the translation into FOT. Now, if R occurs only nega-
tively in γ (thus also in θ), we can define alternatively the translation into FOT↓ as: If
θ= ¬Rxi, define φθ = ¬
∧
j xij = vj ; if θ= α(x) is a literal in whichR does not occur,
define φα = α(x). It is easy to verify that (3) still holds for these two cases. ⊓⊔
To conclude from the above theorems that FOT↓-formulas characterize downward
closed first-order team properties (modulo the empty team), we now prove a charac-
terization theorem for first-order sentences α(R) that define downward closed team
properties, by applying Lyndon’s Interpolation Theorem of first-order logic, which we
recall below.
Theorem 3 (Lyndon’s Interpolation [29]). Let α be a first-order L0-formula and β
a first-order L1-formula. If α |= β, then there is a first-order L0 ∩L1-formula δ such
that α |= δ and δ |= β, and moreover a predicate symbol has a positive (resp. negative)
occurrence in δ only if it has a positive (resp. negative) occurrence in both α and β.
Proposition 4. A first-order L(R)-sentence α(R) defines a downward closed team
property with respect to R if and only if there is a first-order L(R)-sentence β(R)
such that α≡ β and R occurs only negatively in β.
Proof. “⇐=”: Suppose α is a first-order L(R)-sentence in which the k-ary predicate
R occurs only negatively, and we assume w.l.o.g. that α is in negation normal form.
We can show by induction that α is downwards closed with respect to R. The only
nontrivial case is when α=¬Rt. In this case, for any modelM , anyA⊆B ⊆Mk, and
any assignment s, (M,B) |=s ¬Rt=⇒ t
M 〈s〉 /∈B=⇒ tM 〈s〉 /∈A=⇒ (M,A) |=s ¬Rt.
“=⇒”: Suppose that α is a first-order L(R)-sentence that is downwards closed with
respect to R. It is easy to see that α≡ ∃S(α(S/R)∧∀x(Rx→ Sx)), where α(S/R) is
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Table 1. Introduction and elimination rules for the weak logical constants
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ ψ
∧I
Γ ⊢ φ∧ψ
Γ ⊢ φ∧ψ
∧E
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ φ∧ψ
∧E
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ
\\/I
Γ ⊢ φ \\/ψ
Γ ⊢ φ
\\/I
Γ ⊢ ψ \\/φ
Γ ⊢ φ \\/ψ Γ,φ ⊢ χ Γ,ψ ⊢ χ
\\/E
Γ ⊢ χ
Γ ⊢ φ(t/x) Γ ⊢=(t)
∃1I
Γ ⊢ ∃1xφ
Γ ⊢ ∃1xφ Γ,φ(v/x),=(v) ⊢ ψ
∃1E (a)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ∃1xφ Γ,φ(c/x) ⊢ ψ
∃1E (b)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ(v/x) Γ ⊢=(v)
∀1I (c)
Γ ⊢ ∀1xφ
Γ ⊢ ∀1xφ Γ ⊢=(t)
∀1E
Γ ⊢ φ(t/x)
Γ ⊢ φ(c/x)
∀1I (d)
Γ ⊢ ∀1xφ
(a). v /∈ Fv(Γ ∪{φ,ψ}) (b). c does not occur in Γ,φ,ψ
(c). v /∈ Fv(Γ ∪{φ}) (d). c does not occur in Γ,φ
obtained from α by replacing every occurrence ofR by S. Put γ = α(S/R)∧∀x(Rx→
Sx), and note that R occurs only negatively in γ. Then, γ |= α, since for any L(R,S)-
model (M,A,B) such that (M,A,B) |= γ(R,S), we have (M,A) |= ∃Sγ(R,S), which
implies (M,A) |= α(R).
Now, by Lyndon’s Interpolation Theorem, there is a first-order L(R)-sentence β
such that γ(R,S) |= β(R) and β(R) |= α(R), and moreover,R occurs only negatively
in β. It remains to show α |= β. For any L(R)-model (M,A) such that (M,A) |= α(R).
Clearly the L(R,S)-model (M,A,A) satisfies (M,A,A) |= α(S/R)∧∀x(Rx→ Sx).
Since γ |= β, we have (M,A,A) |= β(R), thereby (M,A) |= β(R). ⊓⊔
Corollary 5. For anyL-formulaφ(v) of FOT↓, there exists a first-orderL(R)-sentence
γφ(R) with R occurring only negatively such that (2) holds, and vice versa. In partic-
ular, FOT↓-formulas characterize exactly downward closed first-order team properties
(modulo the empty team).
4 Axiomatizing FOT
In this section, we introduce a system of natural deduction for FOT, and prove the
soundness and completeness theorem. For the convenience of our proofs, we present
our system of natural deduction in sequent style.
Definition 6. The system of natural deduction for FOT consists of all rules for identity,
all rules in Table 1, and the following rules, where letters in sans-serif face (such as x,y)
stand for sequences of variables, c is a constant symbol, =(t) is short for ∃1x(x = t),
con(t) is short for
∧
i=(ti), and cx⊆ vy is short for ∃
1u(u= c∧ux⊆ vy):
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φ ∈ Γ
AssmI
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ,φ ⊢ ⊥
∼˙ I
Γ ⊢ ∼˙φ
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ ∼˙φ
∼˙E
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ,∼˙φ ⊢ ⊥
RAA
Γ ⊢ φ
conI
Γ ⊢=(c)
Γ ⊢ con(t)
conI
Γ ⊢=(f t)
⊆ Id
Γ ⊢ x⊆ x
Γ ⊢ x1 . . .xn ⊆ y1 . . . yn
⊆Pro (a)
Γ ⊢ xi1 . . .xik ⊆ yi1 . . .yik
Γ ⊢ x⊆ y Γ ⊢ y ⊆ z
⊆Tr
Γ ⊢ x⊆ z
Γ ⊢ x⊆ y Γ ⊢ α(y)
⊆Cmp (b)
Γ ⊢ α(x)
Γ ⊢ con(x) Γ ⊢ y ⊆ z
⊆WconΓ ⊢ xy ⊆ xz
Γ ⊢ con(x) Γ ⊢ x⊆ y
⊆W∃1
Γ ⊢ ∃1z(zx⊆ wy)
Γ ⊢ ∼˙x⊆ y Γ,c⊆ x,∼˙c⊆ y ⊢ φ
∼˙⊆E (c)
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ ∼˙λ(x) Γ,c⊆ x,∼˙λ(c) ⊢ φ
∼˙λE (c)
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ,∃1zRz,φ(R) ⊢ ⊥
⊆wIR (d)
Γ,φ(v) ⊢ ⊥
(a). {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} (b). α is ∼˙ and inclusion atom-free.
(c). c is a sequence of constant symbols that do not occur in Γ or φ, and λ is a first-order atom.
(d). Γ is a set of sentences in which R does not occur, φ(R) is an inclusion atom-free sentence in
which the relation symbolR occurs only in the formRx, and φ(v) is a formula with free variables
v obtained from φ(R) by replacing every Rx by x⊆ v.
We write Γ ⊢FOT φ or simply Γ ⊢ φ, if the sequent Γ ⊢ φ is derivable in the system.
Write φ ⊣⊢ ψ if φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ.
The weak disjunction \\/ admits the usual introduction and elimination rule, and note
that the usual elimination rule is not sound for the other disjunction ∨. The soundness
of the introduction and elimination rule for ∃1 follows from the equivalence ∃1x ≡
∃x(=(x)∧φ), and the introduction and elimination rule for ∀1 have a similar flavor.
The rules ⊆ Id, ⊆Pro, ⊆Tr and ⊆Cmp for inclusion atoms were introduced in [17],
and the first three rules completely axiomatize the implication problem of inclusion
dependencies in database theory [3]. The two weakening rules ⊆Wcon and ⊆W∃1 for
inclusion atoms extend the length of an inclusion atom. We leave it for the reader to
verify that these rules for inclusion atoms are also sound and derivable if constants
are allowed to occur as arguments in inclusion atoms (i.e., to allow inclusion atoms,
e.g., of the form cx ⊆ vy). The rules ∼˙⊆E and ∼˙λE in a sense describe the meanings
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of a negated inclusion atom ∼˙x ⊆ y and a negated first-order atom λ(x) by providing
a witness c. These two rules are designed for deriving Proposition 9(ii)(v) (which is
crucial for the normal form lemma, Lemma 11, leading to the completeness theorem),
and they can also be formulated, in a more complex form, without any mention of the
constant symbols. The rule⊆wIR simulates the transformation in Theorem 2, and it will
be applied in the proof of the completeness theorem (Theorem 13) in a reverse manner
with respect to a fresh relation symbol R, which is assumed to be always available.
How to simplify this rule ⊆wIR is left as future work.
Theorem 7 (Soundness). Γ ⊢FOT φ=⇒ Γ |= φ.
Proof. We only verify the soundness of ∼˙⊆E and ⊆wIR.
∼˙⊆E: Suppose Γ |= ∼˙x⊆ y and Γ,c⊆ x,∼˙c⊆ y |= φ, and suppose that for some
L-modelM and teamX ,M |=X Γ . Then we haveM |=X ∼˙x⊆ y, which implies that
there exists s ∈X such that for the L(c)-model (M,s(x)), we have (M,s(x)) |=X c⊆
x∧∼˙c ⊆ y. Thus, by the assumption, (M,s(x)) |=X φ, which givesM |=X φ since c
do not occur in φ.
⊆wIR: Suppose Γ,φ(v) 6|= ⊥. Clearly, every FOT-formula can be turned into a
(semantically) equivalent formula in prenex and negation normal form (cf. Proposi-
tion 8(ii)(iii)(iv)). We may then w.l.o.g. assume that φ(v) is in prenex and negation
normal form. Then there exist a modelM and a nonempty teamX such thatM |=X Γ
and M |=X φ(v). By (the proof of) Theorem 2, (M,rel(X)) |= φ∗(R) in FO, where
φ∗(R) is an FO-sentence obtained from the inclusion atom-freeFOT-sentence φ(R) by
replacing every logical constant in FOT by its counterpart in FO, i.e., by replacing ∼˙
by ¬, \\/ by ∨, ∀1 by ∀, and ∃1 by ∃. It is not hard to prove that (M,rel(X)) |={ /0} φ(R)
in FOT follows. Since Γ is a set of sentences in which R does not occur, we also have
(M,rel(X)) |={ /0} Γ . Also, since X 6= /0, (M,rel(X)) |= ∃
1zRz. Hence, we conclude
Γ,∃1zRz,φ(R) 6|=⊥. ⊓⊔
We collect the basic facts concerning the logical constants in FOT in the following
proposition. The proofs are standard and left to the reader.
Proposition 8. (i) Γ,∀1xφ ⊢ φ(c/x) and Γ,φ(c/x) ⊢ ∃1xφ.
(ii) Q1xφ∧ψ ⊣⊢Q1x(φ∧ψ) and Q1xφ \\/ψ ⊣⊢Q1x(φ \\/ψ), whenever x /∈ Fv(ψ).
(iii) Γ,φ ⊢ ψ iff Γ,∼˙ψ ⊢ ∼˙φ, and Γ,∼˙∼˙φ ⊢ φ.
(iv) ∼˙∀1xφ ⊣⊢ ∃1x∼˙φ, ∼˙∃1xφ ⊣⊢ ∀1x∼˙φ,
∼˙(φ \\/ψ) ⊣⊢ ∼˙φ∧∼˙ψ and ∼˙(φ∧ψ) ⊣⊢ ∼˙φ \\/ ∼˙ψ.
A routine inductive proof that uses Proposition 8(i) shows that the usual Replace-
ment Lemma holds for our logic, that is, if θ ⊣⊢ χ, then φ ⊣⊢ φ(χ/θ), where φ(χ/θ) is
obtained from φ by replacing an occurrence of θ in φ by χ.
It is easy to prove that Γ,φ ⊢ ψ iff Γ ⊢ φ _ ψ. In the following proposition, we
list some derivable technical clauses that will be used in the proof of the completeness
theorem.
Proposition 9. Let ξ and η be two sequences of variables of the same length.
(i) xyξ ⊆ vvη ⊣⊢ x= y∧ xξ ⊆ vη.
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(ii) ξ ⊆ η ⊣⊢ ∀1x(x⊆ ξ _ x⊆ η).
(iii) con(z) ⊢ wξ ⊆ zη ] (w = z∧ ξ ⊆ η).
(iv) con(x) ⊢ x⊆ v ] ∃1y(xy ⊆ vu).
(v) If λ(z) is a first-order atom, then λ(z) ⊣⊢ ∀1w(w ⊆ z _ λ(w)).
Proof. Item (i): The right to left direction follows from ⊆Pro (applied to repeated
arguments in the inclusion atom) and rules of identity. For the left to right direction,
xyξ ⊆ vvη ⊢ xξ ⊆ vη follows from ⊆Pro. Next, by ⊆Pro, rules of identity and ⊆Cmp
we have xyξ ⊆ vvη ⊢ xy ⊆ vv ⊢ xy ⊆ vv∧ v = v ⊢ x= y.
Item (ii): For the right to left direction, by Proposition 8(iii)(iv), it suffices to show
the contrapositive ∼˙ξ ⊆ η ⊢ ∃1x(x⊆ ξ∧∼˙x⊆ η). For any sequence c of fresh constant
symbols, we have c ⊆ ξ,∼˙c ⊆ η ⊢ ∃1x(x ⊆ ξ ∧∼˙x ⊆ η) by Proposition 8(i). Then the
desired clause follows from ∼˙⊆E. For the other direction, by ∀1 I, it suffices to show
that ξ ⊆ η ⊢ c⊆ ξ _ c⊆ η for c a sequence of fresh constant symbols, which is further
reduced to showing that ξ ⊆ η,c⊆ ξ ⊢ c⊆ η. But this follows from ⊆Tr.
Item (iii): We first show con(z) ⊢ wξ ⊆ zη _ (w = z∧ ξ ⊆ η), which is equivalent
to con(z),wξ ⊆ zη ⊢ w = z∧ ξ ⊆ η. By ⊆Wcon we have con(z),w ⊆ z ⊢ wz ⊆ zz. By
item (i), wz⊆ zz ⊢ w = z. Hence, by ⊆Pro the desired clause follows. Next, we show
con(z),w= z, ξ ⊆ η ⊢ wξ ⊆ zη. Again by⊆Wcon we have that ξ ⊆ η,con(z) ⊢ zξ ⊆ zη,
and thus the desired clause follows from rules of identity.
Item (iv): The direction con(x),x ⊆ v ⊢ ∃1y(xy ⊆ vu) is given by ⊆W∃1 , and the
other direction con(x),∃1y(xy ⊆ vu) ⊢ x⊆ v follows easily from ⊆Pro.
Item (v): We first show the left to right direction, which, by ∀1 I, is reduced to
showing that λ(z) ⊢ c⊆ z _ λ(c) for c a sequence of fresh constant symbols. But this
follows from ⊆Cmp. Next, we show the other direction, which is equivalent to the
contrapositive ∼˙λ(z) ⊢ ∃1w(w ⊆ z∧ ∼˙λ(w)). For any sequence c of fresh constant
symbols, we have c ⊆ z,∼˙λ(c) ⊢ ∃1w(w ⊆ z∧∼˙λ(w)) by Proposition 8(i). Then the
desired clause follows from ∼˙λE. ⊓⊔
To prove the completeness theorem, we also need the following three lemmas. The
first lemma emphasizes the fact that all variables quantified by the weak quantifiers
have constant values, the second lemma proves a normal form for FOT-formulas, and
the third lemma shows that derivations in the system of FO can be simulated in the
system of FOT.
Lemma 10. Let φ(v) =Q1xθ(x,v) be a formula in prenex and negation normal form.
Then φ ⊣⊢ φcon, where φcon is the formula obtained from φ by replacing every (first-
order or inclusion) literal µ(x,v) (i.e., an atom or negated atom) by µ∧ con(x).
Proof. By applying Proposition 8(ii),Q1I andQ1E, it is easy to prove thatQ1xθ(x,v)⊣⊢
Q1x(θ(x,v)∧ con(x)). Next we push the formula con(x) inside the quantifier-free for-
mula θ in negation normal form all the way to the front of literals by using Replace-
ment Lemma and the standard equivalences (θ0∧θ1)∧con(x) ⊣⊢ (θ0∧con(x))∧ (θ1∧
con(x)) and (θ0 \\/θ1)∧ con(x) ⊣⊢ (θ0∧ con(x)) \\/(θ1∧ con(x)). ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. For every FOT-formula φ, we have φ(v) ⊣⊢ Q1xθ(x,v), where θ(x,v) is
a quantifier-free formula in negation normal form in which first-order atoms are of the
form λ(x), and inclusion atoms are of the form xi ⊆ v for some variables xi from x.
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Proof. We first turn φ(v) into an equivalent formula in prenex and negation normal form
by exhaustively applying Proposition 8(ii)(iii)(iv). Assume that the bound variables of
φ(v) are among x. By Lemma 10 we may also assume that every literal µ(x,v) in φ is
replaced by µ(x,v)∧ con(x) (call such a formula a formula in constant normal form).
Observe that now in φ(v) a generic first-order atom is of the form λ(x,v), and a generic
inclusion atom is of the form ηξρσ ⊆ η′ξ′ρ′σ′ (modulo permutation by ⊆Pro), where
|η|= |η′| ≥ 0, |ξ|= |ξ′| ≥ 0, |ρ|= |ρ′| ≥ 0 and |σ|= |σ′| ≥ 0,
– (η,η′) = (xi,xj) for some bound variables xi,xj from x;
– (ξ,ξ′) = (xi,vi) for some bound variables xi from x, and free variables vi from v;
– (ρ,ρ′) = (vi,xi) for some free variables vi from v, and bound variables xi from x;
– (σ,σ′) = (vi,vj) for some free variables vi,vj from v.
To obtain the required normal form we have to transform every (first-order or inclusion)
atom in φ in the required form. We achieve this in several steps.
In Step 1 of our transformation, we replace in φ(v) every inclusion atom ηξviσ ⊆
η′ξ′xiσ
′ by vi = xi∧ηξσ ⊆ η
′ξ′σ′. Note that by Proposition 9(iii), we have
con(xi)∧ηξviσ ⊆ η
′ξ′xiσ
′ ⊣⊢ con(xi)∧ (vi = xi∧ηξσ ⊆ η
′ξ′σ′)
and con(xi)∧∼˙ηξviσ ⊆ η
′ξ′xiσ
′ ⊣⊢ con(xi)∧∼˙(vi = xi∧ηξσ ⊆ η
′ξ′σ′).
Hence, by Replacement Lemma, the resulting formula φ1(v) is provably equivalent to
φ. We assume further (here and also in the other steps) that φ1(v) is turned into prenex,
negation and constant normal form by applying Proposition 8(ii)(iii)(iv) and Lemma 10.
In Step 2, we replace in φ1(v) every first-order atom λ(x,v) by ∀
1yz(yz ⊆ xv _
λ(y,z)). By Proposition 9(v), the resulting formula φ2(v) is provably equivalent to
φ1(v). Up to now, every first-order atom in the formula is transformed to the required
form, and the steps afterwards will not generate first-order atoms in non-normal form.
In Step 3, we apply Proposition 9(ii) to replace in φ2(v) every inclusion atom ηξvi⊆
η′ξ′vj by ∀
1wyz(wyz ⊆ ηξvi _ wyz ⊆ η
′ξ′vj), and denote the resulting formula by
φ3(v). In Step 4, we apply Proposition 9(iii) to replace in φ3(v) every inclusion atom
xixk ⊆ xjvk by xi = xj ∧xk ⊆ vk, and denote the resulting formula by φ4(v). Up to now
every inclusion atom in the formula is transformed to the form xi ⊆ vi, where xi are
bound variables and vi are free variables in φ4(v). Yet, vi may contain repetitions, and
it may also be only a subsequence of v. Handling these requires two additional steps.
In Step 5, we remove repetitions on the right side of the inclusion atoms, by applying
Proposition 9(i) to replace in φ4(v) every inclusion atom of the form xixjxk ⊆ vivivj by
xi = xj ∧ xixk ⊆ vivj . Denote the resulting formula by φ5(v). In Step 6, we extend the
length of those shorter inclusion atoms. Assuming v= vivj , we apply Proposition 9(iv)
to replace in φ5(v) every inclusion atom of the form xi ⊆ vi by ∃
1y(xiy⊆ vivj). Denote
the resulting formula by φ6(v).
As before we assume that φ6(v) is turned into prenex and negation normal form,
but now we shall apply Lemma 10 in a reverse manner to remove the added constancy
atoms for each literal in φ6. Finally, the resulting provably equivalent formula is in
the required normal form. Note that our transformation clearly terminates, because we
have performed the steps in the transformation in such an order that each step will not
generate new formulas for which the transformations in the previous steps apply. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 12. Let ∆∪{δ} be a set of FO-formulas whose free variables are among x.
If ∆ ⊢FO δ, then ∆
∗(c/x) ⊢FOT δ
∗(c/x), where ∗ is the operation that replaces every
logical constant in FO by its counterpart in FOT, and c is a sequence of fresh con-
stant symbols. In particular, if ∆∪{δ} is a set of FO-sentences, then ∆ ⊢FO δ implies
∆∗ ⊢FOT δ
∗.
Proof. We prove that∆⊢FO δ implies∆
∗(c/x) ⊢FOT δ
∗(c/x) by induction on the depth
of the proof tree of ∆ ⊢FO δ. If the proof tree has depth 1, then either δ ∈ ∆ or δ is
the identity axiom t = t. In both cases ∆∗(c/x) ⊢FOT δ
∗(c/x) trivially follows in our
system.
If the proof tree has depth > 1, and the last step of the derivation of ∆ ⊢FO δ is an
application of a rule for ¬ or ∧ or ∨ in FO, then we derive ∆∗(c/x) ⊢FOT δ
∗(c/x) by
applying the induction hypothesis and the corresponding (classical) rules for ∼˙ or ∧ or
\\/ in our system for FOT.
If the last step of the derivation of∆ ⊢FO δ is an application of the ∃I rule:
...pi
∆ ⊢ α(t/x)
∃I
∆ ⊢ ∃xα
where the variables and constant symbols occurring in the term t are, respectively,
among vy and d (denoted as t(vy,d)), then the corresponding derivation in FOT is:
...pi∗
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ α∗(t(c′/v,c/y)/x,c/y)
conI
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ con(c′cd)
conI
∆∗(c/y) ⊢=(t(c′/v,c/y,d))
∃1I
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ ∃1xα∗(x,c/y)
where pi∗ is a derivation corresponding to pi given by the induction hypothesis.
If the last step of the derivation of∆ ⊢FO δ is an application of the ∃E rule:
...pi1
∆ ⊢ ∃xα
...pi2
∆,α(v/x) ⊢ δ
∃E
∆ ⊢ δ
where v /∈ Fv(∆∪{α,δ}), then the corresponding derivation in FOT is:
...pi∗1
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ ∃1xα∗(x,c/y,c′/u)
...pi∗2
∆∗(c/y),(α(v/x))∗(d/v,c/y,c′/u) ⊢ δ∗(c/y)
∃1E
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ δ∗(c/y)
where pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2 are, respectively, derivations corresponding to pi1,pi2 given by the induc-
tion hypothesis, and d is a fresh constant symbol.
If the last step of the derivation of∆ ⊢FO δ is an application of the ∀I rule:
...pi
∆ ⊢ α(v/x)
∀I
∆ ⊢ ∀xα
where v /∈ Fv(∆∪{α}), then the corresponding derivation in FOT is:
...pi∗
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ (α(v/x))∗(d/v,c/y)
∀1I
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ ∀1xα∗(x,c/y)
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where d is a fresh constant symbol.
If the last step of the derivation of∆ ⊢FO δ is an application of the ∀E rule:
...pi
∆ ⊢ ∀xα
∀E
∆ ⊢ α(t/x)
where t= t(vy,d), then the corresponding derivation in FOT is:
...pi∗
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ ∀1xα∗(x,c/y)
conI
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ con(c′cd)
conI
∆∗(c/y) ⊢=(t(c′/v,c/y,d))
∀1E
∆∗(c/y) ⊢ α∗(t(c′/v,c/y)/x,c/y) ⊓⊔
Finally, we are in a position to prove the completeness theorem of our system.
Theorem 13 (Completeness). Γ |= φ=⇒ Γ ⊢FOT φ.
Proof. Since FOT (being expressively equivalent to FO) is compact, we may assume
that Γ is finite. Now, suppose Γ 0FOT φ. By RAA we derive Γ,∼˙φ 0FOT ⊥, which is
equivalent to Q1xθ(x,v) 0FOT ⊥, where ψ(v) = Q
1xθ(x,v) is the normal form of the
formula
∧
Γ ∧∼˙φ given by Lemma 11. By applying⊆wIR we obtain ∃
1zRz,ψ(R)0FOT
⊥, where R is a fresh relation symbol, and ψ(R) is the inclusion atom-free sentence
obtained from ψ(v) by replacing every inclusion atom xi ⊆ v by Rxi. It follows from
Lemma 12 that ∃zRz,ψ∗(R) 0FO ⊥, where ψ∗ is the FO-formula obtained from the
FOT-formula ψ by replacing every logical constant in FOT by its counterpart in FO.
Now, by the completeness theorem of FO, there exists a model (M,RM ) such that
RM 6= /0 and (M,RM ) |= ψ∗(R). It then follows from (the proof of) Theorem 2 that
M |=XR ψ(v), where XR = {s : {v1, . . . ,vk} →M | s(v) ∈ R
M} is the (nonempty)
team associated with R. Hence ψ 6|=⊥. ⊓⊔
5 Axiomatizing FOT↓ consequences in D⊕FOT↓
Let D⊕FOT↓ denote dependence logic (D) extended with the syntax of FOT↓, that is,
formulas of D⊕FOT↓ are defined by the grammar:
φ ::= λ |=(t1, . . . , tn, t) | ¬α | φ∧φ | φ∨φ | φ \\/φ | ∃xφ | ∀xφ | ∃
1xφ | ∀1xφ
where λ is a first-order atom and α is first-order. Recall that D captures downward
closed ESO team properties [26]. It can be easily seen from the proof of Theorem 1
that enriching the syntax of D with the weak connective \\/ and quantifiers ∃1,∀1 from
FOT↓ does not increase the expressive power of the logic; in other words, D⊕FOT↓
has the same expressive power as D. In this section, we introduce a system of natural
deduction for the logic D⊕FOT↓ by extending the systems of [27] and [33] for D so
that this new system is sound and complete for FOT↓ consequences in the sense that
Γ |= θ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ θ
whenever Γ is a set of sentences in D⊕FOT↓, and θ is a sentence in FOT↓.
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Table 2. Some rules from the system [27] of D
Γ ⊢ ∃x∀yφ(x,y,z)
=(·)I
Γ ⊢ ∀y∃x(=(z,x)∧φ)
Γ ⊢ φ∨ψ Γ,φ ⊢ χ
∨Sub
Γ ⊢ χ∨ψ
Γ ⊢ φ(t/x)
∃I
Γ ⊢ ∃xφ
Γ ⊢ ∃xφ Γ,φ(v/x) ⊢ ψ
∃E
Γ ⊢ ψ
[v /∈ Fv(Γ ∪{φ,ψ})]
One crucial step in our argument for the completeness theorem involves an applica-
tion of the rule
Γ,∼˙φ ⊢ ⊥
RAA
Γ ⊢ φ
,
where, as in [33], the formula ∼˙φ should be read as a shorthand for the defining formula
of ∼˙φ in the language of the logic in question. In our system this rule will only be ap-
plied for φ being an FOT↓-sentence, and in this case ∼˙φ≡¬φ, where ¬φ is the syntac-
tic negation obtained by pushing negation to the very front of first-order atoms in φ us-
ing the definitions: ¬¬λ := λ, ¬(ψ∧χ) :=¬ψ \\/¬χ, ¬(ψ \\/χ) :=¬ψ∧¬χ, ¬∀1xψ :=
∃1x¬ψ, ¬∃1xψ := ∀1x¬ψ.
Definition 14. The system of natural deduction for D⊕FOT↓ consists of all rules of
the system of D defined in [27] (including rules of identity, and particularly those rules
in Table 2), the rule RAA for φ in the rule being an FOT↓-sentence, all rules in Table 1
from Section 4, and the following rules, where α ranges over first-order formulas only:
Dom
Γ ⊢ ∃x∃y(x 6= y)
Γ ⊢ φ∨⊥
⊥∨E
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ con(x)
\\/wI
Γ ⊢ α(x) \\/¬α(x)
Γ ⊢ ∀1xα
∀1∀TrsΓ ⊢ ∀xα
Γ ⊢ ∀1xφ∨ψ
∀1Ext
Γ ⊢ ∃yz∀1x((y = z∧φ)∨ (y 6= z∧ψ)) [x /∈ Fv(ψ), y,z are fresh]
Γ,con(x) ⊢=(y)
=(·)wI
Γ ⊢=(x,y)
Γ ⊢=(x,y) Γ ⊢ con(x)
=(·)wE
Γ ⊢=(y)
The axiom Dom stipulates that the domain of a model has at least two elements,
which we assume throughout this section. This domain assumption is often postulated
in the literature on dependence logic, especially because over models with singleton
domain all dependence atoms become trivially true (as there is only one single assign-
ment over such a domain). In our setting, the axiom Dom is required for Proposition
16(v), which shows that the weak disjunction \\/ is definable in terms of the other dis-
junction ∨ in D (as long as the domain has more than one elements). The rules ⊥∨E,
\\/wI and∀1∀Trs are evident. The invertible rule ∀1Ext is an adaption of a similar rule
in the system of D in [27], and it is inspired also by a similar equivalence given in
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[14]. The rules=(·)wI and=(·)wE for dependence atoms were introduced in [34] in the
propositional context.
Theorem 15 (Soundness). Γ ⊢ φ=⇒ Γ |= φ.
Proof. We only verify the soundness of ∀1Ext, by showing that ∀1xφ∨ψ≡∃yz∀1x((y=
z∧φ)∨ (y 6= z∧ψ)). For the left to right direction, supposeM |=X ∀
1xφ∨ψ, and we
may w.l.o.g. also assume that x,y,z /∈ dom(X). Then there exist Y,Z ⊆ X such that
X = Y ∪Z ,M |=Y ∀
1xφ andM |=Z ψ. Let a,b be two distinct elements inM . Define
F :X → ℘(M)\ { /0} as F (s) = {a}, and define G :X(F/y)→M by taking
a ∈G(s) ⇐⇒ s ↾ dom(X) ∈ Y, and b ∈G(s) ⇐⇒ s ↾ dom(X) ∈ Z.
Putting X ′ = X(F/y)(G/z) we show that M |=X ′(c/x) (y = z∧φ)∨ (y 6= z∧ψ) for
arbitrary c∈M . Define Y ′ = {s∈X ′(c/x) | s(z) = a} and Z ′ =X ′(c/x)\Y ′. Clearly,
Y ′ ∪Z ′ = X ′(c/x), M |=Y ′ y = z and M |=Z′ y 6= z. Since M |=Z ψ and x,y,z /∈
dom(Z), we have M |=Z′ ψ. Also, since M |=Y ∀xφ, we have M |=Y (c/x) φ, which
impliesM |=Y ′ φ.
For the right to left direction, suppose M |=X ∃yz∀
1x((y = z ∧ φ) ∨ (y 6= z ∧
ψ)). Then there exist appropriate functions F,G s.t. for any a ∈M , there exists Ya ⊆
X(F/y)(G/z)(a/x) =X ′(a/x) s.t.M |=Ya y = z∧φ andM |=X ′(a/x)\Ya y 6= z∧ψ.
Claim: For any a,b ∈M , Ya ↾ dom(X) = Yb ↾ dom(X). Indeed, for any s ∈ Ya ⊆
X ′(a/x), we have s(y) = s(z). For s′ = s(b/x) ∈X ′(b/x), we must also have s′(y) =
s′(z), thus s′ ∈ Yb. Hence, s ↾ dom(X) = s
′ ↾ dom(X)∈ Yb ↾ dom(X). This shows that
Ya ↾ dom(X)⊆ Yb ↾ dom(X). The other inclusion is proved similarly.
Now, to showM |=X ∀
1xφ∨ψ, let Y =Ya ↾ dom(X) andZ =X \Y for any a∈M .
SinceM |=X ′(a/x)\Ya ψ and Z =X \ (Ya ↾ dom(X)) = (X
′(a/x)\Ya) ↾ dom(X), we
obtain M |=Z ψ. Meanwhile, for any b ∈M , by the claim, Y = Yb ↾ dom(X). Since
M |=Yb φ and Yb ↾ (dom(X)∪{x}) = Y (b/x), we obtainM |=Y (b/x) φ. ⊓⊔
In the following proposition we list some technical clauses that will be used in our
proof of the completeness theorem. In addition, Proposition 8(i)(ii) are still derivable in
the system of D⊕FOT↓ by the same derivation.
Proposition 16. (i) ⊢=(z, c), and in particular ⊢=(c) for any constant symbol c.
(ii) =(cx,y) ⊣⊢=(x,y) for any constant symbol c.
(iii) ∀1vQu(φ∧=(vx,y)) ⊣⊢ ∀1vQu(φ∧=(x,y)) and ∀1vQu(φ∧=(x,v)) ⊣⊢ ∀1vQuφ.
(iv) ∃1xφ ⊣⊢ ∃x(=(x)∧φ).
(v) φ \\/ψ ⊣⊢ ∃x∃y
(
=(x)∧=(y)∧
(
(x= y∧φ)∨ (x 6= y∧ψ)
))
, where x,y are fresh.
(vi) ∃x∀1yφ(x,y,z) ⊢ ∀1y∃x(=(z,x)∧φ) and ∀x∀1yφ ⊣⊢ ∀1y∀xφ.
Proof. Item (i): By rules of identity we have ⊢ c= c∧z= z, which implies ⊢ ∃x∀y(x=
c∧ z = z). Now, by =(·)I we derive ⊢ ∀y∃x(=(z,x) ∧ x = c∧ z = z), which yields
⊢=(z, c).
Item (ii): For the direction =(cx,y) ⊢ =(x,y), by applying =(·)wE we derive that
=(cx,y),=(c),con(x) ⊢ =(y). Since ⊢ =(c) by item (i), we conclude by =(·)wI that
=(cx,y) ⊢=(x,y). The other direction is derived similarly by applying=(·)wE, =(·)wI
and item (i).
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Items (iii): By Proposition 8(i) and ∀1I it suffices to showQu(φ(c/v)∧=(cx,y)) ⊣⊢
Quφ(c/v)∧=(x,y) and Qu(φ(c/v)∧=(x, c)) ⊣⊢ Quφ(c/v). But these follow from
items (i) and (ii).
Item (iv): The direction ∃x(=(x)∧φ) ⊢ ∃1xφ follows easily from ∃E and ∃1 I. For
the other direction, by Proposition 16(i), we have ∃1xφ ⊢ φ(c/x). Moreover, by rules of
identity, ⊢=(c) and ∃I, we have φ(c/x) ⊢ ∃x(x = c∧=(c)∧φ(c/x)) ⊢ ∃x(=(x)∧φ).
Putting these together we obtain ∃1xφ ⊢ ∃x(=(x)∧φ).
Item (v): We first prove the right to left direction. By ∃E it suffices to prove that
=(x),=(y),(x= y∧φ)∨(x 6= y∧ψ)⊢φ \\/ψ. We first derive=(x),=(y)⊢ x= y \\/x 6= y
by \\/wI. Next, by applying ∨Sub, ⊥∨E and \\/I, we derive
x= y,(x= y∧φ)∨ (x 6= y∧ψ) ⊢ φ∨ (x= y∧x 6= y) ⊢ φ∨⊥ ⊢ φ ⊢ φ \\/ψ
and similarly x 6= y,(x= y∧φ)∨ (x 6= y∧ψ) ⊢ φ \\/ψ. Hence, we conclude by \\/E that
x= y \\/x 6= y,(x= y∧φ)∨(x 6= y∧ψ)⊢ φ \\/ψ, from which the desired clause follows.
For the left to right direction, by \\/ I, it suffices to prove that the right formula is
derivable from both φ and ψ. We now first derive the right hand side from φ. By the
rules of identity, ⊢ ∃x∀z(x = x) for some fresh variables x,z. Thus, we conclude by
applying=(·)I that ⊢ ∀z∃x(=(x)∧x= x), which reduces to ⊢ ∃x=(x). Next, we derive
by rules of identity that ⊢ ∃x(=(x)∧∃y(x= y)) and thus ⊢∃x∃y(=(x)∧=(y)∧x= y).
Lastly, we conclude by the introduction rule of ∨ that
φ ⊢ ∃x∃y(=(x)∧=(y)∧x= y∧φ) ⊢ ∃x∃y(=(x)∧=(y)∧ ((x= y∧φ)∨ (x 6= y∧ψ))).
Similarly, to derive the right hand side from ψ, first note that by Dom we have
⊢∃x∃y(x 6= y) for some fresh variables x,y, which then yields ⊢∃x∀z∃y(x 6= y). Then,
by a similar argument as above, we derive by applying =(·)I that ⊢ ∃x(=(x)∧∃y(x 6=
y)), and that ⊢ ∃y(=(y)∧∃x(=(x)∧(x 6= y))), from which the required clause follows.
Item (vi): ∀x∀1yφ ⊣⊢ ∀1y∀xφ follows easily from Proposition 8(i). For the other
clause, by ∃E, it suffices to prove ∀1yφ(x,y,z) ⊢ ∀1y∃x(=(z,x)∧ φ). We derive by
Proposition 8(i) and the rules for ∀,∃ that ∀1yφ(x,y,z) ⊢ φ(x,c,z) ⊢ ∃x∀wφ(x,c,z)
for some fresh constant symbol c and variable w. Moreover, by =(·)I we derive that
∃x∀wφ(x,c,z) ⊢ ∀w∃x(=(z,x)∧φ(x,c,z)) ⊢ ∃x(=(z,x)∧φ(x,c,z)). Putting these to-
gether and by applying ∀1I we conclude that ∀1yφ(x,y,z) ⊢ ∃x(=(z,x)∧φ(x,c,z)) ⊢
∀1y∃x(=(z,x)∧φ). ⊓⊔
Recall from [31] that every D-formula φ(z) is logically equivalent to a formula of
the form
∀x∃y
(∧
i∈I
=(xi,yi)∧α(x,y,z)
)
, (4)
where each xi are from x, each yi is from y, and α is first-order. In the next theorem we
derive a similar normal form for formulas in D⊕FOT↓.
Theorem 17. Every D⊕FOT↓-formula φ(z) is semantically equivalent to, and prov-
ably implies a formula of the form
∀1v∀x∃y
(∧
i∈I
=(xi,yi)∧α(v,x,y,z)
)
, (5)
where each xi are from x, each yi is from y, and α is first-order.
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Proof. We adapt the argument for the normal form proof in [27]. We give the semantic
and syntactic proof at the same time, and the semantic equivalence clearly follows from
the syntactic equivalence (by soundness theorem) whenever the latter is available in the
following steps of the proof. First, rewrite every occurrence of θ \\/χ and ∃1xη in φ using
the equivalent formulas with logical constants from D given by Proposition 16(iv)(v),
and denote the resulting provably equivalent formula (which is \\/ and ∃1-free) by φ′.
Next, turn the formula φ′ into a formula Q1x. . .Qnθ in prenex normal form, where
each Qi ∈ {∀,∃,∀
1} and θ is quantifier-free. This step is done, as in [27], by induction
on the complexity of the formula φ′, where the inductive steps with ∀1 follow from the
provable equivalences given by Proposition 8(ii) and the rule ∀1Ext.
Now, since θ(x) is a formula of D, we proceed in the same way as in [27] to turn
θ into a formula of the form ∀y∃z(
∧
i∈I di(x,y,z) ∧α(x,y,z)) = ∀y∃zθ
′, where each
di is a dependence atom and α is first-order. The formula θ is semantically equivalent
to ∀y∃zθ′, and in the deduction system of D we can prove (as is done in [27]) that
θ ⊢ ∀y∃zθ′. Thus, altogether we now have φ≡Qx∀y∃zθ′ and φ ⊢Qx∀y∃zθ′.
To turn the formula Qx∀y∃zθ′ finally into the required normal form (5), we swap
the order of the quantifiers using an inductive argument similar to that in [27], where
the inductive step for ∀1 is taken care of in the deduction system by applying Propo-
sition 16(vi), and on the semantic side by using the equivalences ∃x∀1yψ(x,y,z) ≡
∀1y∃x(=(z,x)∧ψ) and ∀x∀1yψ ≡ ∀1y∀xψ (we leave it for the reader to verify). To
conclude the proof, we apply Proposition 16(iii) to remove variables quantified by ∀1
in dependence atoms di(x,y,z) in the first conjunct of the quantifier-free formula. ⊓⊔
Recall also from [27] that for everyD-sentence ψ in normal form (4), there is a first-
order sentence Ψ of infinite length (called the game expression of ψ) such that for any
countable modelM , M |= ψ iff M |= Ψ . Moreover, the infinitary first-order sentence
Ψ can be approximated by some first-order sentences Ψn (n ∈ N) of finite length in
the sense that for any recursively saturated (or finite) modelM , M |= Ψ iff M |= Ψn
for all n ∈ N. Also, in the system of D one derives ψ ⊢D Ψn for any n ∈ N. Now, for
any D⊕FOT↓-sentence φ= ∀1vψ of the form (5) with ψ a D-sentence, it is not hard to
show (by the same argument as in [27]) that the game expressionΦ∗ of φ can be defined
as ∀vΨ , and the n-approximation Φ∗n can be defined as ∀vΨn for each n ∈ N. Next, as
in [27], we show that every n-approximationΦ∗n can be derived from the formula φ.
Theorem 18. For any D⊕FOT↓-sentence φ and any n ∈ N, φ ⊢ Φ∗n.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we may assume that the L-sentence φ = ∀1vψ(v) is of the form (5)
with ψ(v) a D-sentence. Let c be a sequence of new constant symbols. Observe that
the L(c)-sentence ψ(c/v) is in the normal form (4) for D-formulas. By the result in
[27] we have ψ(c/v) ⊢ Ψn(c/v). Thus, by Proposition 8(i), ∀
1 I and ∀1∀Trs, we derive
∀1vψ(v) ⊢ ψ(c/v) ⊢ Ψn(c/v) ⊢ ∀
1vΨn(v) ⊢ ∀vΨn(v), thereby φ ⊢ Φ
∗
n. ⊓⊔
Theorem 19 (Completeness). For any set Γ of D⊕FOT↓-sentences and an FOT↓-
sentence θ, Γ |= θ =⇒ Γ ⊢ θ.
Proof. We only provide a sketch of the proof, which combines the arguments in [27]
and in [33]. Suppose Γ 0 θ. Then Γ,∼˙θ 0 ⊥ by RAA, where ∼˙θ = ¬θ as θ is an
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FOT↓-sentence. Let Γ ∗ be the set of all approximations of sentences in Γ ∪ {¬θ}.
By Theorem 18, we have Γ ∗ 0⊥. Since restricted to first-order formulas our extended
system (or the system ofD as defined in [27]) has the same rules as the deduction system
of the usual first-order logic, we derive Γ ∗ 0FO⊥. From this point on we follow exactly
the argument in [27] to find a modelM for Γ ∪{¬θ}. Thus,M |= Γ andM 6|= θ. ⊓⊔
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